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11 Introduction
The formation and implementation of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is the topic
of a broad economic literature. A signi¯cant part of the literature uses game theory as a tool
to understand the formation mechanism of IEAs. There are two main directions of literature
on IEAs (for a review of current literature see Finus 2003; Carraro/Siniscalco 1998; Ioanni-
dis/Papandreou/Sartzetakis 2000; Carraro/Eyckmans/Finus 2005). The ¯rst direction utilizes
the concepts of cooperative game theory in order to model the formation of IEAs. This is a rather
optimistic view and it shows that an IEA signed by all countries is stable provided that utility is
transferable and side payments are adequate (Chander/Tulkens 1995, 1997). The second direction
uses the concepts of non-cooperative game theory to model the formation of IEAs. At the ¯rst
level, the link between the economic activity and the physical environment is established in order
to generate the economical-ecological model. This link is established through a social welfare func-
tion. The social welfare function captures the di®erence between the pro¯t from pollution and the
environmental damage.
The Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) model provides
the social-welfare functions in our model.
Following this approach, countries play a two stage-game. In the ¯rst stage, each country decides
to join the IEA, or to stay as non-member. In the second stage, every country decides on emissions.
The main body of literature examining the formation of IEA within a two stage framework uses a
certain set of assumptions. We mention below only the essential ones:
² Decisions are simultaneous in both stages.
² Countries are presented with single agreements.
² Stability of IEA's is based on the ideas developed for cartel stability (d'Aspremont et al.
((1983)) and requires so-called internal and external stability. Internal stability means that
a country does not have an incentive to leave the coalition. External stability means that a
country does not have an incentive to join the coalition. When defecting from coalition, a
country assumes that all other countries remain in the coalition (this is a consequence of the
employed stability concept of d'Aspremont et al that allows only singleton movements and
myopia).
2² Within the coalition, players players cooperatively and maximize their joint welfare, while
the coalition and single countries compete in a non cooperative way.
Non-cooperative game theory draws a pessimistic picture of the prospect of successful cooperation
between countries. It claims that a large coalition of signatories is hardly stable, and that the
free-rider incentive is strong. The model explains the problems of international cooperation in the
attendance of environmental spillovers, but cannot explain IEAs with high membership such as
the Montreal Protocol. This calls for a modi¯cation of the standard assumptions. We mention in
the following paragraphs some of the possible modi¯cations.
Asheim et. al (2006), Carraro (2000) and Osmani & Tol (2006) allow more than one IEA to be
formed. They reach the conclusion that two IEA's can perform better than one IEA in regional
environmental problems.
Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis (2002), Eyckmans (2003) and Osmani & Tol (2007a,b) use the far-
sighted stability concept instead of D'Aspremont myopic stability. The farsighted stability is
¯rstly introduced by Chwe (1994). The idea of farsightedness implies that one should check for
multi-step stability by comparing the pro¯ts of a coalition member after a series of deviations
has come to an end. Non-cooperative game theory predicts more optimistic results by employing
farsighted stability.
The main contribution of the paper is the discussion on the assumption of joint welfare maximiza-
tion. As the members of coalition play cooperatively we compare the joint welfare maximization
with classical cooperative game theory value such as Shapley Value and Nash bargaining solution.
We make use of farsightedly stable coalitions that comes form applying the Climate Framework
for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) model (see Osmani & Tol (2007a).
In section two, the FUND model is described. We continue with introducing our game-theoretic
model, farsighted stability and coalitions that are going to be considered. In the next section,
the di®erent sharing schemes such as Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining and Consensus Value are
presented. In ¯fth section section, our results are discussed. Section six concludes. In Appendix
the results are introduced in eight di®erent Tables.
32 FUND model
This paper uses version 2.8 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distri-
bution (FUND). Version 2.8 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and applied by Tol
(1999a,b, 2001, 2002c), except for the impact module, which is described by Tol (2002a,b) and
updated by Link and Tol (2004). A further di®erence is that the current version of the model
distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions. Finally, the model considers emission reduction of methane
and nitrous oxide as well as carbon dioxide, as described by Tol (forthcominga).
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. The
model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America (USA),
Canada (CAN), Western Europe (WEU), Japan and South Korea (JPK), Australia and New
Zealand (ANZ), Central and Eastern Europe (EEU), the former Soviet Union (FSU), the Middle
East (MDE), Central America (CAM), South America (LAM), South Asia (SAS), Southeast Asia
(SEA), China (CHI), North Africa (NAF), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Small Island States
(SIS). The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The prime reason for start-
ing in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In FUND, the impacts of climate
change are assumed to depend on the impact of the previous year, this way re°ecting the process
of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot
be approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of climate change tend to be
misrepresented in the ¯rst few decades of the model runs. The period of 1950-1990 is used for
the calibration of the model, which is based on the IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes, Goldewijk,
1994). The period 1990-2000 is based on observations (WRI, 2000). The climate scenarios for the
period 2010-2100 are based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between
IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate
past, and the period 2100-2300 extrapolated.
The scenarios are de¯ned by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous en-
ergy e±ciency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of the energy use (autonomous
carbon e±ciency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change, methane
and nitrous oxide. The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact
of climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that re-
4sult from changes in heat stress, cold stress,malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold stress
are assumed to have an e®ect only on the elderly, non-reproductive population. In contrast, the
other sources of mortality also a®ect the number of births. Heat stress only a®ects the urban
population. The share of the urban population among the total population is based on the World
Resources Databases (WRI, 2000). It is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between
urbanization and per-capita income, which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995.
Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world also causes the population sizes to
change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective
host population.
The market impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and investment are
reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change reduces long-term eco-
nomic growth, although consumption is particularly a®ected in the short-term. Economic growth
is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the economy and
the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be
accelerated by abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide,
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon dioxide emis-
sion reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the economy
and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the
atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide,
measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the ¯ve-box model of Maier-Reimer
and Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992). The model also
contains sulphur emissions (Tol, forthcominga).
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is determined
based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up
to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-life of 50 years. In the
base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2:5±C for a doubling of carbon
dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean temperature
by a ¯xed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs
(Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level
5determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years. Both temperature and sea level are
calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of
Kattenberg et al. (1996).
The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002b,c) includes the following categories: agriculture,
forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress,
malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and un-
managed ecosystems. Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of
change (benchmarked at 0:04±C) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1:0±C). Damages from
the rate of temperature change slowly fade, re°ecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002c). People can die
prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they can migrate because of sea
level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these e®ects are monetized. The value of a statistical
life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita income. The resulting value of a statistical life
lies in the middle of the observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value of
emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita income (Tol, 1995, 1996), the value of immigration
is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and
wetlands due to sea level rise are modelled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square
kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994).
Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are
valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994).
The wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is
based on cost-bene¯t analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construc-
tion of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze.
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, are directly
expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts measured in their 'natural'
units (cf. Tol, 2002b). Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture, and car-
diovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which
is determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers.
Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving
closer to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions
are further away from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard
6to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the
speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always
negative (cf. Tol, 2002c). The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged
ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as
simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign (cf.
Tol, 2002c). Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth,
and technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water
resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and ecosystems
and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to become less vulnera-
ble, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth)
and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002c).
Note that we make use of data only for the year 2005. This is su±cient as static game theory is
used but with a sophisticated stability concept.
2.1 Welfare function of FUND model
For the analysis of coalition formation, we approximate the FUND model with a linear quadratic
structure. Speci¯cally, the abatement cost function is represented as:
Ci = ®iR2
iYi (1)
where C denotes cost, R relative emission reduction, and Y gross domestic product; i indexes





where B denotes bene¯t and E unabated emissions. Tables 1 gives the parameters of Equations
(1) and (2) as estimated by or speci¯ed in FUND. Moreover the pro¯t P is given as:





7Table 1: Our data from year 2005, ® abatement cost parameter (unitless), ¯ marginal damage
costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of carbon) E carbon dioxide emissions (in
billion metric tonnes of carbon) Y gross domestic product, in billion US dollar. Source: FUND
.
® ¯ E Y
USA 0.01515466 2.19648488 1.647 10399
CAN 0.01516751 0.09315600 0.124 807
WEU 0.01568000 3.15719404 0.762 12575
JPK 0.01562780 -1.42089104 0.525 8528
ANZ 0.01510650 -0.05143806 0.079 446
EEU 0.01465218 0.10131831 0.177 407
FSU 0.01381774 1.27242378 0.811 629
MDE 0.01434659 0.04737632 0.424 614
CAM 0.01486421 0.06652486 0.115 388
LAM 0.01513700 0.26839935 0.223 1351
SAS 0.01436564 0.35566631 0.559 831
SEA 0.01484894 0.73159104 0.334 1094
CHI 0.01444354 4.35686225 1.431 2376
NAF 0.01459959 0.96627119 0.101 213
SSA 0.01459184 1.07375825 0.145 302
SIS 0.01434621 0.05549814 0.038 55
Non-cooperative optimal emission reduction is then:
dPi=dR = ¯iEi ¡ 2®iRiYi = 0 ) Ri = ¯iEi=(2®iYi) (4)
If region i is in a coalition with region j, optimal emission reduction is:
dPi+j=dRi = 0 ) Ei(¯i + ¯j) ¡ 2®iRiYi = 0 ) Ri = (¯i + ¯j)Ei=(2®iYi) (5)
The price for entering a coalition is therefore higher emission abatement at home. The return is
that the coalition partners also raise their abatement e®orts.
Note that our welfare functions are orthogonal, this indicates that the emissions change of a country
do not a®ect the marginal bene¯ts of other countries (independence assumption). In our game,
countries outside the coalition bene¯t from the reduction in emissions achieved by the cooperating
8countries but they cannot a®ect the bene¯ts derived by the members of the coalition. As our cost-
bene¯t function are orthogonal our approach does not capture the e®ects of emissions leakage.
But our cost bene¯t function are su±ciently realistic as they are approximation of complex model
FUND and our procedure of dealing with farsighted stability is general and appropriate for non-
orthogonal functions also.
3 Our model
There are 16 world regions (we name the set of all regions by N16) in our game theoretic model
of IEA's (or coalitions), which are shown in ¯rst column of Table 1. At the ¯rst level, the link
between the economic activity and the physical environment is established in order to generate the
economical-ecological model. This link is established through a social welfare function of FUND
model, see 7. The social welfare function captures the di®erence between the pro¯t from pollution
and the environmental damage. Following this approach, countries play a two stage-game. In the
¯rst stage, each country decides to join the coalition C µ N16 and become a signatory (or coalition
member) or stay singleton and non-signatory (membership game). These decisions lead to coalition
structure S with c coalition-members (c denotes the cardinality of C) and 16-c non-members. A
coalition structure simply fully describes how many coalitions (at the moment we assume that we
have one coalition) are formed, how many members each coalition has and how many singleton
players are. Given the simple coalition structure S is fully characterized by coalition C. In the
second stage, every country decides on emissions (strategic game). Within the coalition, players
play cooperatively (by maximizing their joint welfare) while the coalition and single countries
compete in a non cooperative way (by maximizing their own welfare). Every coalition C is assigned
a real number À(C) (called characteristic function).
De¯nition 3.1 By the characteristic function of our 16-player game (played by c and 16 ¡ c
players, where c is cardinality of coalition C) we mean a real-valued function À(C) : C ! R;
À(C) = max(
Pc
1 ¼i) 8i 2 C; C ½ N16; c · 16:
Characteristic function is simple the total pro¯t that coalition-member reach by maximizing their
joint welfare. As ¼ are strictly concave, their sum is strictly concave also, which simpli¯es the
maximization problem. The game satis¯es the superadditivity property:
9De¯nition 3.2 A game is superadditive if for any two coalitions, C1 ½ N16 and C2 ½ N16 :
À(C1 [ C2) > À(C1) + À(C2) C1 \ C2 = ;:
The superadditivity property means that if C1 and C2 are disjoint coalitions (here C1 and C2 can
be single players too), it is clear that they should accomplish at least as much as by joining forces
as by remaining separate. But the game almost always (with some exceptions) exhibits positive
spillovers:
De¯nition 3.3 A game exhibits positive spillover property if and only if for any two coalitions
C1 ½ N16 and C2 ½ N16 such as C1 * C2 and C2 * C1 we have:
8k = 2 C1 [ C2 Àk(C1 [ C2) > Àk(C1) ^ Àk(C1 [ C2) > Àk(C2)
It indicates that there is an external gain (C1 and C2 can be single players too) or a positive
spillover from cooperation, making free-riding (i.e., not joining C1 [C2) attractive. It just implies
that every player k = 2 C1[C2 has higher pro¯t when two coalitions C1 and C2 cooperate compared
to the situation where two coalitions stay separated. It indicates that from a non-signatory's point
of view (player k here), the most favorable situation is the one in which all other countries take
part in the coalition (except k). As we have already mentioned the positive spillover property is
almost always satis¯ed with the exception of some coalitions that contain as members Japan &
South Korea or Australia & New Zealand which have negative marginal bene¯ts (negative ¯'s)
from pollution abatement.
As our game is formally de¯ned, we concentrate the attention to farsighted stability. In our model
framework, the farsighted stability is mainly based in two arguments. The ¯rst one is the coalition
change process (sometimes we will call it coalition inducement1) which includes all possible was
that a coalition can change. Basically coalition change process solves the question: Can a part of
members of our coalition (or all) improve their welfare (by help of non-member coalition or not) by
forming a new coalition. The players are farsighted in the ¯rst sense that they check all possible
ways for forming a new coalition in order to improve their welfare. The second arguments is a
behavioral assumption for our farsighted players (or regions) in order to deter free-riding. Suppose
that there is no way to improve the welfare for a coalition, but a country can still free-ride and
improve his welfare alone! We assume that our players are farsighted in another sense namely
1In our previous paper Osmani & Tol (2007a) in stead of concept coalition change process we use only the
notation of inducement process by introducing a strict de¯nition of it.
10they refuse to free-ride because they take into account that the other members of coalition can act
similarly, which will ¯nally result in welfare decrease for everyone.
3.1 Farsightedly stable coalitions
Below a short introduction of farsighted stability is introduced, and then farsighted coalitions
,which we are going to consider, are presented.
As we will consider only pro¯table coalition. The situation in which each country maximizes its
own pro¯t is referred to as the atom structure; it is a standard Nash equilibrium; the maximum
coalition size is unity. A coalition that performs better than atom-structure is a pro¯table coalition.
We limit our attention to coalitions, which are pro¯table and this is su±cient to ¯nd all farsightedly
stable coalitions2.
We concentrate in the di®erent ways that a coalition can change. There are four ways3 of a coalition
change (or coalition inducement); the coalition gets bigger; gets smaller; some coalition-member
leave coalition and some other join it; fourth way is a special one, namely the free-riding, one
country or more leave the coalition and increase their welfare.
If a coalition get bigger, it follows that the original members of coalitions see an increase in pro¯ts
and the new members see an increase too; we say that an external inducement is possible. This
can be easily checked by a combinatorial algorithm.
De¯nition 3.4 If no external inducement is possible than the coalition is external farsightedly
stable (EFS).
If a coalition gets smaller, its remaining members see an increase in pro¯ts; we say that an internal
inducement is possible.
De¯nition 3.5 If no internal inducement is possible than the coalition is internal farsightedly
stable (IFS).
The third way of coalition inducement is if a number of old coalition members leave and a number
of new members join the coalition. The new coalition may be larger or smaller than the original
2See Observation 3.1 in Osmani & Tol (2007a).
3We also introduce ¯ve ways of inducement process in Osmani & Tol (2007a), and here only four, as we present
a short introduction only.
11one. One needs to check if countries in a ¯nal coalition increase their pro¯ts by forming a new
coalition. We call it sub-coalition inducement.
De¯nition 3.6 If no sub-coalition inducement is possible than the coalition is sub-coalition far-
sightedly stable (SFS).
It needs more combinatorial work to check if a sub-coalition inducement is possible.
As we noted one special coalitional change is caused by free-riding. In our model, free-riding is
deterred based on motivation that originates from experimental game theory (Fehr & GÄ achter
(2000), Ostrom (2000))4, which predicts that if a player free-rides, as the rest of players get this
information, a part of them (not all) is going to free-ride also. This results in worsening of the
welfare for every player. We assume that our players (countries in our approach) possess the
knowledge that if free-riding appears, it will be spread out and other players countries will start
to free-ride. This assumption deters free-riding and ¯ts well to farsighted behavior as takes into
account the counter reaction of other countries. As free-riding is prevented based on behavioral
assumption, which implies that there is no free-riding for any coalitions then inducement caused
by free-riding can not be included in de¯nition of farsighted stability.
Now we are able to present the de¯nition of farsighted stability:
De¯nition 3.7 If no internal, external and sub-coalition improvement is possible than the coalition
is farsightedly stable.
Testing a coalition for farsighted stability means comparing the pro¯t of his country members with
the pro¯t of country members of all possible coalitions (that can be induced or not) and ¯nding the
coalitions that can be induced. The farsightedly stable coalition that will be discussed are:
(USA;LAM;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA)
(CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS;SIS)
Further more we are going to discuss two sub-coalitions of above coalitions:
4The mentioned papers consider behavior of the people not of countries as we would like. But we consider the
assumption (on spreading of free-riding behavior) relevant for our framework as it go well with the spirit of farsighted
behavior and takes into account the counter reaction of other players.
12(USA;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA)
(CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS)
For a more detailed description how the farsightedly stable coalitions are found please see Os-
mani & Tol (2007a).
4 Di®erent sharing schemes
The joint welfare maximization is compared with Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining solution and
Consensus Value. In the following subsection we will describe them shortly.
4.1 Shapley Value
Suppose we form a coalition C by entering the players into this coalition one at a time; À(C) is the
characteristic function of coalition C, see de¯nition 3.1; jCj is cardinality of coalition C, and n is
total number of players. As each player enters the coalition, he receives the amount by which his
entry increases the value of the coalition he enters. The Shapley value is just the average payo®
to the players if the players are entered in completely random order.




(jCj ¡ 1)!(n ¡ jCj)!
n!
(À(C) ¡ À(C ¡ fig)) (6)
The interpretation of this formula is as follows. Suppose we choose a random order of the players
with all n! orders (permutations) of the players equally likely. Then we enter the players according
to this order. If, when player i enters, he forms coalition C (that is, if he ¯nds C ¡ fig there
already), he receives the amount (À(C) ¡ À(C ¡ fig)). The probability that when i enters he
will ¯nd coalition S ¡fig there already is
(jCj¡1)!(n¡jCj)!
n! . The denominator is the total number of
permutations of the n players. The numerator is number of these permutations in which the jSj¡1
members of C ¡ fig come ¯rst ((jCj ¡ 1)! ways), then player i, and then the remaining n ¡ jCj
players ((n ¡ jCj)! ways). So this formula shows that Ái(À) is just the average amount player i
contributes to the coalition if the players sequentially form this coalition in a random order.
134.2 Nash Bargaining solution
The axiomatic theory of bargaining originated in a fundamental paper by Nash (1950), we simply
adapt it to our problem. If a part (or all) of countries (we suppose that we have six countries without
loss of generality) agree to form a coalition and behave cooperatively and the rest of countries
optimize their own welfare function. We concentrate to 6 countries that form the coalition. The
scenario is that 6 world regions have access to any of the alternatives in some set <6, called the
feasible utility set. Their preferences over the alternatives in the utility set are given by welfare
function P:





where C denotes cost, R relative emission reduction, and Y gross domestic product; i indexes re-
gions; ® is the cost parameter; B denotes bene¯t and E unabated emissions.
If no coalition is formed, they end up at a pre-speci¯ed alternative in the feasible set called the
disagreement point, which is denoted by vector d. In our model d is pro¯t vector of atom structure
with 6 elements where every country optimize his own pro¯ts. More formally, a bargaining problem
is de¯ned by the tuple (<6;d) where the utility set (<6) has to be (and is) a non-empty, convex,
and compact subset. We further assume that there exists an p 2 <6, such that p À d. In our case,
Nash bargaining solution, denoted fN(<6;d) is given by
fN(<6;d) = argmax
Q
i=1:::6(Pi ¡ di) where Pi = Bi ¡ Ci = ¯i
Pn
j RjEj ¡ ®iR2
iYi
This means simply we need to ¯nd the abatement level R of 6 coalition members that maxi-
mize fN (as Pi is function of R). Note than the abatement level R of ten remaining countries are
known as they simply maximize their own welfare function (we need them in order to calculate




Let us consider an arbitrary 2-person cooperative TU game with player set N = f1;2g and char-
acteristic function v determined by the values: v(f1g);v(f2g) and v(f1;2g). A reasonable solution
is that player 1 gets:
14v(f1g) + [v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)]=2
and player 2 gets:
v(f2g) + [v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)]=2
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2, v(f1;2g)¡v(f2g)¡
v(f1g), is equally shared between the two players. This solution is called the standard solution
for 2-person cooperative games. Ju, Y., Borm, P., Ruys, P. (2004) provide a generalization of the
standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases. Consider a n-person game (N;v) while
the grand coalition Cn = f1;2;::;ng is formed than the player (n + 1) (let call the new player
just player (n+1)) joins the coalition and the coalition Cn+1 = f1;2;::;n;n + 1g is formed. The
generalization of player (n + 1) share is:
v(fn + 1g)
| {z }
v of the single player (n+1)
+ [v(f1;:::;n + 1g) ¡ v(fn + 1g) ¡ v(f1;::;ng)]
| {z }
the surplus from cooperation of Cn and player (n+1)
¢1=2
The interpretation of above formula is as follows. We can see the above situation as 2-person
game. The coalition Cn = f1;2;::;ng is considered as one player and the next player is the new
player (n + 1) that joins the coalition. The (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between
coalition Cn and the new player is v(f1;:::;n+1g)¡v(fn+1g)¡v(f1;::;ng). The equation above
says that the new player take the amount he gets alone v(fn + 1g) plus the half of the surplus.
v(fi j i 2 Cng)
| {z }
v of a member of Cn
+ [v(f1;:::;n + 1g) ¡ v(fn + 1g) ¡ v(f1;::;ng)]
| {z }
the surplus from cooperation of Cn and player (n+1)
¢1=2 ¢ 1=n
Each of n-players that was already in coalition Cn gets his payo® as member of coalition Cn
plus half of the surplus divided by n.
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Before presenting results, we de¯ne:
Pjoint;Pshap;Pnash;Pcons: the sharing pro¯t according to joint welfare maximization, Shapley
Value, Nash Bargaining solution and Consensus Value.
(Pjoint¡Pshap)
Pjoint ¢100: relative di®erence in percentage between joint welfare maximization and Shap-
ley value.
(Pjoint¡Pnash)
Pjoint ¢100: relative di®erence in percentage between joint welfare maximization and Nash
Bargaining Solution.
(Pjoint¡Pcons)
Pjoint ¢ 100: relative di®erence in percentage between joint welfare maximization and Con-
sensus Value.
Our numerical computations are programmed in Matlab5 programming language, and results are
introduced in Appendix. Table (2) presents the results for the ¯rst coalition
(USA;LAM;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA), Table (3) for the second coalition (CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS;SIS),
Table (4) for the third coalition (USA;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA) and Table (5) for the forth coali-
tion (CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS). The Tables are similar, in the ¯rst column are coalition members,
and in the second, third and fourth column the relative di®erences of joint welfare maximization
compared to Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining Solution and Consensus Value.
The results show that joint welfare maximization is very similar to Nash Bargaining solution. Their
relative di®erences are almost always less than 1% for four coalitions (in only one case more than
1%). The Shapley Value and Consensus Value di®er signi¯cantly to joint welfare maximization for
the ¯rst and third coalition, but they are similar for the second and fourth coalition.
In order to have a more complete picture of results, the absolute value of joint welfare maxi-
mization, Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining Solution and Consensus Value for every coalition6 are
5Programs can be provided to the reader on request.
6The absolute values ca be also used to check the validity of conclusions.
16provided in Table (6), Table (7), Table (8) and Table (9). The Tables are identical, in the ¯rst
column are coalition members, and in the second, third, fourth and ¯fth column are values of joint
welfare maximization, Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining Solution and Consensus Value. The last
row presents the sum of all coalitions members value for every welfare sharing scheme used. It is
clear that the sum has to be equal for every welfare sharing scheme used (for the same coalition),
but due to round errors they are only approximately the same. The errors are less than 0:01 for
the ¯rst coalition (USA;LAM;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA), and less than 0:001 for all three other
coalitions.
. . .
One way to see the numerical comparisons, is that Shapley and Consensus Value take into
account the possible ways of coalition formation. The Shapley Value considers all the ways of
coalition formation while the Consensus Value assumes a speci¯c way of coalition formation. On
the opposite the joint welfare maximization and Nash Bargaining Solution are ways of maximizing
the total pro¯t of coalition without considering how the coalition is formed.
6 Conclusions
The literature in international environmental agreements supposes that countries within a coalition
maximize their joint welfare while the single countries play non-cooperatively against the coalition
and against each-other. We investigate if joint welfare maximization shares the welfare level fairly
among coalition members. The joint welfare maximization is compared to classical cooperative
game value like Shapley Value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value for four di®erent
coalitions. The Nash bargaining solution gives similar solution compared to joint welfare maxi-
mization. The Shapley Value and Consensus Value di®er signi¯cantly compared to joint welfare
maximization. One can consider the joint welfare maximization as reasonable assumption as it is
similar also with another well-known scheme such as Nash Bargaining solution. Further work is
needed in considering more coalitions and approach that is more general.
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Table 2: The relative di®erences (in percentage) between the joint welfare maximization and
three other di®erent sharing schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and
Consensus Value for coalition (USA;LAM;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA).
Coalition members Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
USA 3.7 % 0.022 % 9.4 %
LAM -27.2 % -0.69 % -49.9 %
SEA -26.0 % -0.18 % -51.7 %
CHI -15.4 % 0.27 % -0.82 %
NAF 24.1 % -0.78 % 13.3 %
SSA 18.6 % 0.43 % 8.0 %
Table 3: The relative di®erences (in percentage) between the joint welfare maximization and
three other di®erent sharing schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and
Consensus Value for coalition (CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS;SIS).
Coalition members Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
CAN 1.25 % 0.27 % 1.25 %
EEU -0.92 % 0.46 % -0.46 %
CAM -0.15 % 0.55 % -0.15 %
SAS -0.13 % 0.0013 % 0.0013 %
SIS 0.04 % -0.79 % -0.79 %
18Table 4: The relative di®erences (in percentage) between the joint welfare maximization and
three other di®erent sharing schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and
Consensus Value for coalition (USA;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA).
Coalition members Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
USA 2.47 % 0.49 % 7.29 %
SEA -27.27 % -3.26 % -51.82 %
CHI -15.07 % 0.28 % -2.62 %
NAF 22.71 % 0.1 % 12.42 %
SSA 17.2 % 0.12 % 6.76 %
Table 5: The relative di®erences (in percentage) between the joint welfare maximization and
three other di®erent sharing schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and
Consensus Value for coalition (CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS).
Coalition members Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
CAN 0.99 % 0 % 0.49 %
EEU -0.92 % -0.46 % -0.92 %
CAM 0 % -0.7 % -0.7 %
SAS 0 % 0.13 % 0 %
19Table 6: The absolute value of Joint Welfare Maximization and three other di®erent sharing
schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value for coalition
(USA;LAM;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA).
Coalition members Joint Welfare Max. Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
USA 0.7218 0.6953 0.7216 0.6539
LAM 0.0806 0.1026 0.0812 0.1209
SEA 0.2143 0.27 0.2147 0.3251
CHI 0.8443 0.9747 0.842 0.8512
NAF 0.4163 0.316 0.4195 0.3609
SSA 0.4367 0.3554 0.4348 0.4019
| 2.714 2.714 2.7138 2.7139
Table 7: The absolute value of Joint Welfare Maximization and three other di®erent sharing
schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value for coalition
(CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS;SIS).
Coalition members Joint Welfare Max. Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
CAN 0.0204 0.0201 0.0203 0.0201
EEU 0.0217 0.0219 0.0216 0.0218
CAM 0.0144 0.0144 0.0143 0.0144
SAS 0.0753 0.0754 0.0753 0.0753
SIS 0.012 0.012 0.0121 0.0121
| 0.1438 0.1438 0.1436 0.1437
20Table 8: The absolute value of Joint Welfare Maximization and three other di®erent sharing
schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value for coalition
(USA;SEA;CHI;NAF;SSA).
Coalition members Joint Welfare Max. Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
USA 0.6916 0.6745 0.6882 0.6412
SEA 0.2057 0.2618 0.2124 0.8384
CHI 0.817 0.9401 0.8147 0.3123
NAF 0.3976 0.3073 0.3972 0.3891
SSA 0.4173 0.3455 0.4168 0.3482
| 2.5292 2.5292 2.5293 2.5292
Table 9: The absolute value of Joint Welfare Maximization and three other di®erent sharing
schemes, respectively Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value for coalition
(CAN;EEU;CAM;SAS).
Coalition members Joint Welfare Max. Shapley Value Nash Bargaining Consensus Value
CAN 0.0202 0.02 0.0202 0.0201
EEU 0.0216 0.0218 0.0217 0.0218
CAM 0.0143 0.0143 0.0144 0.0144
SAS 0.0752 0.0752 0.0751 0.0752
| 0.1313 0.1313 0.1314 0.1315
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